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"The settlers' town is a strongly-built town, all made of 
stone and steel. It is a bri3htly-lit town; the streets are covered 
with asphalt, and the garbage-cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, 
unknown and hardly thought about. Tl-1e settler I s feet are never visible, 
except perhaps in the' sea; but there you're never close enough to see 
them. His feet are protected by strong shoes althougl1 the streets of 
his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler's 
town is a well-fed town, an easy-going town~ its belly is ahJays full 
of good things. The settler's town is a town of vhite people, of 
foreigners. 
The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the 
native town, the Hegro village, the mec1_ina, the reservation, is a 
place of ill fame peopled by rnen of evil repute. They are born there, 
it matters little?- uhere or how; they <lie there, it matters not where 
nor how. It is a world without spaciousness: men live there on top of 
each other, and their huts are built or,e on top of the other. The native 
tmm is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of r3hces, of coal, of 
light. The native town is a crouchin<,; village, a town on its knees, a 
town wallowing in the mire. It is a tm,m of nir;gen, and dirty arabE:. 
The town that the native turns on the settler 1 s town is a look of lust, 
a look of envy ... " ( Fan on) 
The year 2000 is only 33 years mn1y. That is the year we hone to retire, 
and it can serve as a useful horizon for vieuinr, the terrible problems of the 
underdeveloped world and the possible role for Canada. 
The prospects for the world in our time are not good. It is in the context 
of a bleak picture that Canmlians must choose and act. It is likely that at the 
outset of the 21st century the number of people livinp, in poverty will be as much 
as double the current number. He have few i_llusions about what Canada will he 
willing to do. He suggest policies that are possible even j_f not probable. Even 
a small power, if it understands the situation, can do something to help, and in 
some cases, this can even be done with little cost and great benefit to itself. 
There is a conflict of interest between the first and third ,rnrld. Canada 
has a choice between being a middle power in the first world or making a heroic 
effort to transcend this conflict. It can do this by providing wider 
options for underdeveloped countries. Canada cannot by itself solve the problems 
of the underdeveloped world, but it can contribute to an environment in which 
the underdeveloped countries hav<2 a chance to help themselves. 
The underdeveloped countries do not have much scope for ir.dependent action. 
Their resources are too limited. Still, they <lo not do as uell as they might. 
They inherit from their past, and from their colonial experience, institutions 
unsuited to their present problems. 
In Canada, it is will rather than ability which is lacking. We are on the 
threshold of a new era where our own basic problems of food, clothing and shelter 
can be solved, by old standards,, at least. The material base provides the oppor­
tunity for new initiatives. There is the possibility for experiment. 
Surprisingly, there is a new significance in small uni_ts. It is, for example, 
at the level of the city that we now face the important questions of how we live, 
walk, eat, work, learn, sleep and pray. And recent Canadian experience shows that 
the most vigorous quest for a life style occurs at the provincial, not the national 
level. 
At the international level, independence for Canada is only meaningful in 
relation to the great issues the world now faces. For our lifetime the problems 
of the underdeveloped countries will intensify, and though we try to ignore them, 
we can do so only by sacrificing part of ourselves. "There are no innocents and 
no onlookers. We all have dirty hands." (Fanon) 
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II 
The facts about Horld poverty· are well known. 1 They are publicized and 
repeated from the most respectable sources--but like t11e death statistics of 
great disasters, they are beyonc1 comprehension. Nevertheless, it is worth re­
peating them, because they are to be ,vith us for the foreseeable future, perhaps 
,-lith increasin1:; horror. 
Such a recitat:..on of the crude facts must include the information that: 
1. 1~t Cl,rrent growth rates, the 3ap behreen the poor ond the Healthy 
nations increases steadily; in the rich countries rapid and steady tech­
nolosical ch::mc;e provides the main impetus for c;rowth while the underdeveloped 
countries have the c;reo.test difficulty in absorbing the teclmolocy that 
already exists. 11In the rich comitries averCLr;e income per head is going up 
· about $50 a 3rear; in the poor countries by about $2. 50 a year and in the very 
poor countries by about $l. 50 )er ;y20.r. "2 The gap for the poor between what 
they do nncl the potential provided by modern technology" g--rows each year. 
2. Within the poor world, the r!1ore prosperous nuclei are not c;rmrin,3 fast 
enough to lower the absolute nwnber livine; in rural poverty. Grm-rine; pools 
of unemployment are the result. 
3. Population growth bas become such that it is becoming :raore difficult 
to meet even minimal requirements of bare existence. 
~-. Even if grmrth rates of 6 per cent per annwn were achieved--1-rell in 
excess of past average performance and even greater than the objectives 
of the U.N. development deco.de--by the end of this century the per capita 
income of the poor countries would still be dismally low--perhaps only 
$100 per capita in India and in some 1~frican countries, for example. 
Economics is again the dismal science. 
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repeated from the most respectable sources--but like the death statistics of 
great disasters, they are beyond comprehension. Nevertheless; it is worth re­
peating them, because they are to be with us for the foreseeable future, perhaps 
with increasine; horror. 
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· about $50 a year; in the poor countries by about $2.50 Cl year and in the very 
poor countries by about $1.50 :9er yearo 112 The gap for the poor between what 
they do nnd the potential provided by modern technology" g,.rows each year" 
2. Within the poor world, the more prosperous nuclei are not c;rm-ling fast 
enough to lower the absolute nwnber living in rural poverty. Grouing pools 
of unemployr:ient are the result. 
3. Population growth has become such that it is becoming more difficult 
to meet even minimal requirements of bare existence. 
4. Even if grm-1th r3.tes of 6 per cent per annum uere achieved--well in 
excess of past average performance and even greater than the objectives 
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III 
Typically, these facts are introduced o.s a prelude to charitable instincts; 
we parade the poor and pass the plate. That little comes of this is perhaps to 
be expected. On the domestic scene very few of our deep-seated social or economic 
problems have been solved by an appeal to predominantly charitable instincts. The 
amounts generated are inevitably small and their allocation is more closely 
tailored to the tastes of the donor than the needs of the reci1,ient. 3 
In the development of the first world, primary reliance has been placed on 
the private initiative of businessmen to mobilize resources for ca};)ital foruation 
and technological change. The government has acted to help business ancl. to o.me-
liorate some of the more serious dislocations resultinc; from industrialization, 
but by and large has not played an initiating role except for overheuc1 capito.l. 
There is little reason to expect the government to do ubroacl 1·1hat it c~oeo not C::.o 
at home. It is more in line with our history that governments loot at their aid 
programs as handmaidens to the private business sector (their own or those abroad) 
rather than as the main vehicle of growth. Even if the goverruilent -wished to o.o 
otherwise it has little scope because it is not government but our private corpora-
tions that possess the capital, tecl1noloc;y and enterprise that are so badly 
needed abroad. If such institutions can be little influenced even at home, it 
is hardly surprisinc; that they cannot be mobilized for public purposes abroad. 
The total volmne of Horld aid, after a period of rapid c;rowth, has stao;nated 
4in recent years. Since some of what we call aid is not an outric;ht gift but 
merely a long term loan at interest rates which are low only in cornpariGon ,·rith 
recent market rates, the net :free foreign exchange made available to countries 
on public accmmt is declining, the flow of interest costs and debt repayment out 
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of the underdeveloped countries offsets a substantial proportion of the gross 
aid. 1; nwi1ber of developing countries ho.ve therefore found the111selves in severe 
balance of payments tlifficulties. to ,·Thich heavy fixed obligations to service 
overseas holdings of public debt have ri1ade o. significant cont::cibution. 
5 
Even more serious are privo.te account flows: the reverse flou of earnings 
and of capital transfer have more than out-1-reic;hed new foreic;n invest:ment. The 
foreic;n investruent which does occur is concentro.tecl in industries satisfyinc; 
the needs of the developed i:wrld, such as the pctrolewa industry, rather than 
being directed tm-rards engenc.ering endoc;enous c;;rowth processes '\'Iithin the tmder­
developed countries. The lo.cl: of donor enthusiasm to 2_:,:..0 ovi:le 2. lonc;-ten1 finance 
on soft terDs has been co;,1binecJ. uith an ove::n·1illins;ness to provide s~1ort-term 
loans. Businessr!len 1·1ishing to sell to the underdevelucled iror.7.d receive c;reat 
encourae;ement from the c;overnment through export cred:i t 0ue.rantee arranc;ements 
for commercio.l credits and contractor fin~mce. Ofter::. these are for 2.Jrecisely 
the projects which uould be rejected in the context of an aid proe;ramE1e. The 
harrassed bureaucracies of underdeveloped countries accept this foru of help. 
'l'hi::: short-term commercial credit on hard teri;1s creates fixed obligations, some­
times of alarming proportion. Overseas finance in these circumstances creates 
a resource transfer in the short-term but fairly soon the debt must be repayed, 
often before the investment yields a return. The underdeveloped countries then 
must appeal for refinancing and, through virtual international bankruptcy, lose 
control over their policies to the lending nations, typically through the medilrrn 
of international agencies. 
The Economist's report on the treatment of Ghana provides a case in point 
(August 6, 1966). The Economist estiE1ated tho.t Ghana's Imblic debt uas over 
one billion dollars and over tuo-thirds of this total uas in debt of average 
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maturity of six years or less. Their toncue-in-cheel: description of the pre­
liminary creditor's meeting of June) 1966, runs: 
"Ghana explained its plic;ht to the representatives 
of 13 1·1estern countries, the r;eneral reaction uas somewhat 
reserved. The ~·:wiss said, predictably~ that debts were debts 
and they hoped Swiss debts would be paid promptly. The Ger­
man delegate brought up the question of German property con­
fiscated in Ghana during the Har. The Israeli delegate said 
he hoped Israel would be considered to qualify as one of the 
underdeveloped countries entitled to uninterrupted repayment. 
The British delegate said he hoped any stretch-out of repay­
ments would be a "reasonably short one". 
The ineffectiveness of aid not only derives from the inadequacy of the 
net flows and the danc;ers of excessive international indebtedness, but also 
results from the character of the aid given. 
Politics and development are necessarily interrelated. But the political 
content of aid prograrmnes is unfortunate, for the distribution of aid is rnore 
influenced by the strategic and ideoloc;ical pre-conceptions of the major donors 
than by any assessment of the c;enuine development implications of the political 
6
institutions of the recipients. Since there is no lmderlyinc; harmony of interest, 
these differences are critical. Only too often strategic considerations are 
interpreted in a short-term context, stressing foreign rather than domestic 
policies of the recipients. 
This is perhaps not surprising. Aid, after all, could only have reached 
the level it has if somethinr; more than the charitable instincts had been aroused. 
It would matter less if the amount involved were very large. "Client" 
states of the United Etates in the Far I;ast have achieved very favourable rates 
of c;rowth--Formosa and South Korea, for example. If the ·wealthy countries are 
willing to take a sizeable enouQ;h interest in a country it may well develop 
irrespective of the other circw.nstances. 
Houever, no such larce flow is likel~, and effectiveness of the meagre flow 
is reduced by non-econoraic choices, sometimes to the ~)oint of counter-effective­
ness by bolsterin,3 rec;ir.ies alien to c'.;eveloprnent. 
IV 
Not surprisingly, aid has not 1JOrked miracles. Throughout the third world 
political tensions and conflicts continue and are:; if anything, aggro.vated by 
growth. 
Tragically, hmrever, the frustrations and tensions are not fim1ing their 
outlet in creative social transformation, but in civil and regional strife with 
destructive consequences. ProGrarnmes of national independence, initially focused 
against colonial powers, becorae banners for strui:;gles beh-reen groups in the under­
developed world. These tensions and conflicts are inevitable. The appeal to 
increase aid to avoid revolution is both danc;erous, because it avoids the reality 
of the poor world, and dishonest, in that it cannot succeed in any such purpose, 
at the aid levels which are enviso.e;ec',. If the prevention of revolution is seen 
as one of the purposes of aid, it is only too easy to turn to other tools when aid 
fails to achieve the desired counter-revolutionary purpose. 
Seen at the deepest level; the cJ.ilem::m of aid, both in the form of capital 
and technical assistance~ is that it bolsters the metropolitan influence in the 
ex-colonial world, when the most profound problems in the recipient countries 
involve the need to breal: fron certain social, economic and cultural metropolitan 
influences, no matter ho-w altruistic the motivo.tion of the mother country. Develop­
r,1ent is made at home. 
The answer that is sometimes offered. is multilateralisrn--a popular view in 
Canada. But international ac;encies tal:e on the ideoloc;ico.l overtones anc1 cultural 
assurnptions of their major sponsors o This is certainly true of the Horld Bank, 
for example, with its J\merican-1\nc;lo anioience o Even when international ac;encies 
develop views and interests 1;,1hich are not too tied to the foreign policy objec-
tives of a major cmmtry; multilateralism is only satisfactory as an addition 
to the constellation, rather than as a consolidation and replaceL1ent for other 
aid sourceso In the end, individual underdeveloped countries are better off when 
faced with a nuL1ber of parties on the other side of the table in international 
financial nec;otiations. 1\!hen thieves fall out, It 
It is very i1aportant for poor countries to have a range of choice, so that 
the consequences of breaking with one source of support is not necessarily 
disastrouso 
Effectiveness of aid is also reduced by policies which use aid programmes 
as a tool of trade policy o7 'rl1e n01,r prevalent practice of tying bilatero.l 
o.id to imported goods frora the donor (even the UoSo is now forced in this direc­
tion by her chronic balance of payments problem), warps the design of plans and 
projects, reduces the real value of the aid flol'l, and has undesirable effects on 
the evolution of trade patterns by inhibiting trade within the poor worldo 
In criticizine; aid policy there is no intention to imply maliciousness 
amongst aid agencies anymore than it characterized the colonial civil serviceo 
' 
They are staffed by the most humane of public servants. However, the exic;encies 
of the balance of payments crises in the United Kingdom, for example_ ho.ve been 
such that it is haindly surprising that there should have been an attemrit to mini-
8
mize the foreign exchange costs of the aid prograrnrae o Foreign aid supporters 
are forced to demonstrate to those public servants responsible for the balance 
of payments situation,or for trade promotion) the consistency of the aid effort 
·\Iith other public objectives. Only in that ,,a::/ c::o ::;:irogr3.1.Jr.1es survive o A necessary 
result, in a 1wrld with chronic shortaGe of forei;::sn e~:cho.nc;e reserves, has been 
increased tying of aid to the exports of the donor countries; rather than allow­
ing bilateral transfers to generate multilateral tro.de flous. 
A look at the performance of major donors illustrates some of the problems 
of aid. Both Britain and France reEiain heavily corim1itted to their traditional 
imperial interests. 9 This is especially true in I\frica, ,-rhere p:cogrann:1es of 
financial aid are combined with the maintenance of elaborate 1Jroc;rmm-,1es of 
technical assistance, with the objective of making the transfer of administra­
tions to full local control as painless, and perl10..ps as sloH, as possible. 
In some countries, government is still dependent on the mother cotmtry for 
recurrent costs. The virtue in these prograrnraes has been to maintain high levels 
of civil administration Hhere there i'Tould other,·1ise have been the danger of sHift 
deterioration. The cost has been the failure to initiate o.ny c;reat experiments 
in administrative practice with the achievernent of formal independence. The 
result has been, only too often, t11e creation of elites who occupy the offices 
without any noticeable improvement in responsiveness to the country's problem. 
Too great an exercise of independence on the part of the new African powers 
diminishes the flow of aid--this happened abruptly at a very early stage in the 
relationship between Guinea and France, fo:c example, and has resulted from the 
recent break between Tanzania and Britain. Ar,ain, frorn the point of view of the 
donor) the action may not be malicious; it was not surprisinc;, after all, that 
suspension of a "f,7 million aid offer should flow from Tanzania's decision to 
break diplomatic relations with Britain's Labour Government, over the weak 
British policy towards the Rhodesian rebellion. 
Generally, however, both Britain and France have managed to maintain a 
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consider-able dec;:ree o:.'.' influence in IJrcvious colonies. In r;1any parts of _frico.) 
the most serious competitor for influer._ce is the U.S. 
The United States position is different. 
"The United States beco.me involved in international 
development aid on a Liajor scale principally as a byproduct of 
the world uicle responsibilities thrown upon it as a leader of the 
Tile stern Wo:tld after World Har II. The size as ,rell as the direction 
of U.S. aid is an erbraordinary blend of humanitarian sentiment and 
cold war strategy. 11 
While Britain and France have been moving from a situation of outright 
control) back to prepared positions of pervasive but less obtrusive influence, 
the U.S. has been en[!:aged in the reverse process. The U.S. has asserted dominant 
and overt influence in many areas over the past decade,, Her involvement is 
carried tot.he necessary breadth of activity and strength of commitment. 
When the United States decides to make a major commitment, the penetration 
can be pervasive and the effect overv1heli:1inc;---capital oid, food supplies:. eco-
nomic, political and military advisors, educational support. Such involvement 
can lead to economic c;rowth, but it cannot be a satisfactory technique throughout 
i:;he underdeveloped 1;1orld. In the context of severe social tensions; the tendency 
is for the United States to identify lJith conservatives and as they come w1der 
attack, the pos.sibility of American military involvement arises. The sequence 
is not unlike that which in the past has led to the establishment o:f great empires. 
But for se 1eral reasons; the United States is condemned to create an eL1pire 
based almost exclusively on an extreme system of indirect rule. This could be 
most effective in conditions in which there are appropr:cate indigenous croups 
who can form effective ac;encies of U.S. policy. However, too often the only 
material avaj_lable :is of sorry qu3i_ity, and wi3~1.t be e;:pcctecl to perform very 
inadequately as promoters of development. Perlw.ps, c;iven the inevitability of 
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,;rn.erican influence; it i:wuld be healthj_er if it 1)e1':I'ori:1ed more directly. There 
can be little doubt tho.t if ;\derican control were directly implemented, and 
:m1erican technology and ideology brought directly to 11ork on the development 
problems in those rec;ions of current American interest, the effects uould be 
economico.lly more satisfactory than those of the dubious governments they find 
themselves bolstering. 
One view of the clilernmas America faces uas set out by I,lillilmn and Rostow 
in an article in Foreign Affairs in April 1958. 1Je quote at length because their 
article has proved to be a c;ood prediction of subsequent policy. Rostow has since 
become the 1,io.jor Presidential advisor on these problems. They comment that 
"the buildinc; of modern economies and centralized modern c~overn­
ments has been driven alone:; less by the profit motive than by the 
aspirations for increased national and hu:c1an dignity." 
The American interest in the third world is fundamentally political, as they 
see it. Countries j_n the third world. are in a transitional phase in uhich 
nationalism may turn in varyine:; proportions to three objectives: one, the 
consolidation of the pm-Jer of the neu state over old 1°ecional interests; tvo. 
external adventure; three, economic and social L1odernization. At the time of 
writing the article, they thought that these strateGies were typified by Diem, 
Nasser, and Nehru respectively. 
The third objective is critical because it determines the lenr;th of the 
transition to modernity. 
"Cornmunist policy," they note, "is based squarely on an understanding 
of this precarious transitional process ... Soviet diplomacy and propaganda 
have systematically souc;ht to divert their attention from the tasks of 
modernization towards 'bloody shirt' policies; that is, an obsessive 
concern to redress real or believed past humiliations--colonialisrn, Israel, 
Kashmir, West Irian, etc. 
We are confronted with a systematic effort--diplomatic, psychological, 
economic and political--to exploit the weaknesses, confusions, and tempta­
tions of ne,,r nations in the transitional period so as to clamp communism 
down finally on them before steady economic c;rowth and the political 
resilience of a modern state emerge." 
Faced with this challenc;e they see 
" ... the essential objective of American policy in the tranoitional 
areas is to use whatever influence we can brine to bear to focus the 
lecal enerc;~_es, talents, and resources on the constructive tasks of 
rnodernization. 11 
They identif;y three propositions 
"first, that private enterprise in superior in efficiency to public 
enterprise, even in the underdeveloped areas; second, that substantial 
unta.ppecl potentialities exist in pL1blic policy both for expandinc; 
American r;rivate CD.Ilital ezy,orts and for increased collaboration 
between publ::.c aml private sources of capital; ancl third, that the 
AL1erican c;overnrnent could do rnore than it is nm·T doinc; to create a 
more favourable climate for private investment in the underdeveloped 
areas.:, 
They see, houeve:c, that too s1Iift returns on their proposed proc;ram must 
not be expected. What ir. needed • nl C 
11 
••• a sense of history and patience ... to see us through into the stac;e 
when most Lien and c;overnrnents in the ,mrld come to preceive that 
private cap:~talis1i1, domestic anc.-:. foreic;n, has an eA-panding role to play 
in the neu nations capable of reinforcinc; their larger political and 
social objectives. 11 
At the conclusion) the Hriters comment: 
"In addition, there remains the challen_sing and extremely important 
tasl~ of findinc.; a method and an instrwnent for co-'.Jrdinatinc; tl1e economic 
developme:1t proc;rar;1s, 1101,1 mainly bilateral, Hithin the f:ree worlcJ_. 11 
I\. major question for Canada is to exm:1ine the dee:;ree to which it ac;rees 
Hith this perception of the problem and the remedies proposed. 
The major fault of this position is that it Q;rossly oversimplifies the 
p:i:oblem of the unclen1evelopcd countrieG and leads to a forrn of involve1;1ent -which 
is good for neither the first nor the third uorld. It involves the underdeveloped 
Norld in the inter;:i.al ~,robleras of' the U. 8. o.nd in the conflict betueen the first 
and second uorld,s. S'airly quietly the c;oal of openinc; up these countries to 
-private capital and of protcctinc; them from their II,1co.J~nesses 1 confusions) and 
temptations:t becowes the encl "en itselfc 
Underdeveloped countries uust solve their proble1:1s in the context of their 
mm history o Insteo.d of forcinc; upon thei;1 the myth,s o.nrl conventional uisdoras of 
other cotmtries" stresc should be p1aced on :.::;ivinc; them more room to m.J.neuvero 
Ira-ported dcvelopnent strategies did not Horl: unde1' paleo-•colonialism_ and there is 
not :r:mch reason to expect them to work .under neo-colonialism. 
For the 11Third Horld" one possibility was to rnanipulate Cold War competitiono 
The existenr::e of a Soviet Bloc 1:1ight be thought to provide aid and trade possi-­
b_'_lities, and to allow the poor countries more maneuverability in their efforts 
to maintain their freecloL1 from the Free 1;for1cL That this could be so in practice 
uas indicated by the perfornance of the UoA .R. over the yeo.:;:.•s o 'rhe rei:mrtable 
rmccesses of the Ifasse:c rec:;irilc r;1ay be in rmrt due to the fact that their 1,1ost 
severe confronto.tion 1·1ith the Free World came in their conflict -ui th B:citain and 
Frs.nce rather than the UoS. Tile :9ossibilities of this alternative must not be 
exac;gerated o The Soviet Union has shoi:m no enthusiasm for any great expansion 
of its role in the less developed ,·rorld. If anythinc;: it has tended t01mrds 
increasing caution o Soviet aid has been limitec.1 and has been as r,mch attached 
to the particular e:::port potentialities of the Soviet economy as has the bilo.teral 
aid uhich emanates from the Hest, and in many cases, a good deal less sldllfully 
appliedo Further, the increasing detente between the Soviet anc1 the UoS. in the 
Cold War muGt narrow the possibilities of the less developed ,10rld in this 
respecto 
China has, surprisincly enouGh, at times provided c;enerous and Gensible 
financeo Surprisingly, as her own economic situation is no better than that of the 
countries she has aided O Houever, the possible mo.te:dal contribution of China 
r.1ust obviousl~r be extremely limited b:, the ure;ency of her own needs o The role 
of Chino. is more lil::ely to serve as an example of the possibility of development 
without depenclence--not in the sense of Mnoist revolution, but rather in a more 
general sense of the possibility of independent action, if backed by sufficient 
will and unity over a large enou7b area. 
Thus, in a broad outline, the r,lobal coPtcxt in which Canada must consider 
its relationship with the uaderdeveloped world is one in which: 
(i) colonial dependency has ended but independence has not been achieved; 
(ii) the new forms of control may be less effective in engendering develop-
rnent than the benevolent paternalism of some parts of the old colonialism; 
(iii) freedom of maneuver in the less developed world depends partly on the 
diversity of alternatives in the rich world. 
V 
A Productive Role for Canada 
It is well for small countries not to exaggerate their own importance. 
They should also recognize that the grand design of world affairs is not ex­
clusively the product of the great powers. 
Canada cannot transform the world because of her small size and because 
the pursuit of policies contradictory to those of the U.S. will involve costs 
of retaliation and loss of good~·Ji.11. 
Further, there is nothing in the character of Canadian society which would 
suggest that if it became a major particip.ant in the communication with the poor 
countries, it would not eventually develop similar policies and attitudes as the 
other great powers. It has not, in the West Indies, performed notably differently 
from other powers. 
However, some potentialities exist. Canada, with a gross national product 
of $57 billion, commands a greater annual flow of output than the whole of black 
Africa, or of India. Canada, a midget compared with the North American colossus, 
still has economic capabilities comparable to major regions of considerable 
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2ignificance. If Canada ever allocated l',~ of her national product to the aid 
proc;ranme as promised in the recent speech from the Throne (instead of one 
quarter of one per cent in past years), he17 .corifribution would be of similar 
order to that currently made by Britain; 11hen it is also considered that there is 
a heavy concentration of the American proc;ro.mme in regions of special American 
interests (:i)articularly those areas in which heavy military aid is provided), 
it becomes clear that it vould be feasible for Canada to maintain a proc;ramme 
in selected regions of the developinc; 110rlc1 of financial rnac;nitudes similar 
to those of the existing major donors. 
J/Ioreover, Canada has rnore potential for a flexible proc;rarnrne than govern­
ments Hho have maintained major proc;rammes over the lone; period. The British 
are hamstrung by existing and onc;oins political obligations. Givers as well as 
receivers are bound by the past. Britain finds that with a proc;rarnme stagnant 
in total size there is very .little flexibility to stril:e out in neu directions, 
even if there is a desire to do so. The lad: of traditional commit-
ments, or strongly defined exist.inc; interests, makes it uossible to conceive of 
a Canadian aid policy Hith more flexibilitJ and :,1ore attention to the needs of 
the developing world than would be e;~pected of 1aany other major donors. 
If Canada were uillinc;, it coulc.1c have o.n iupact beyond the irnrn.ecliate 
effect of the transfers involved. If; for e;~auple, Canada stood ready to increase 
the level of her commitment in cases where the recipient·country had fallen 
foul of other donors:; this would strenc;then the barc;aininc; position of the poorer 
countries in their dealings uith the other rich countries. The fact that Canada 
-was, for example, able to fill part of the c;ap follo11ing the dis1aantlinc; of the 
Uest German assistance proc;ra.r,1ri1e to Tanzania minimized the costs to Tanzania of 
pursuinc; an independent political policy. Had this alternative not been open 
to Tanzania, the:ce uoulc1 be a depressinc; effect on other African countries con­
templatinc; effo:rts to assert their political independence. 
Such a role uill not be easy_, especially ,!here major conflicts ,-rith entrenched 
economic interests are involved o 1\s this paper is beine; written, the ConGo-
Kinshasa c;overm1ent is enc;ac;ccl in direct confrontation ,'Tith Union Miniere over 
the control of the Conc;olese copper industry. The record of the Union Uiniere 
in the Congo has been a sorry one of subversion and intrigueo In lic;ht of recent 
and past Congolese history, a Congolese c;overn1;1ent of any repute Hould Hish to 
assume control over the decisions o.nc.1 c;ain access to the property of the Union 
Ihniere. Their ability to clo so effectively; however, ,1ill depend not only on 
the ability of the im1ic;enous c;overnuent to uitl1stand incursions of foreign 
elements into their politicrJ but 1.rill also require them to maintain the operation 
of the industry in the event of the ,-ri thdro.,ml of Belc;ian technical personnel 
and an internationally orc;anizeci_ attempt to prevent access of Conc;olese copper 
to world ma::cl:ets O Unfortunately, one suspects that the Belc;im1 c;overnrnent and 
Union Miniere would be more effective in controllinc; the sale of Conc;olese 
exports than the British c;overnrnent has been in restraining Rhodesian exports. 
In a case such as this, if it cornes to eventual confrontation, it seems 
unlikely that Canada -would pursue policies openly at variance uith those of 
the rest of the "Free Tlorld"o Indeed; one sees no specio.1 reason to suppose 
that Canadians ,muld have any desire to do so. The point is that it is Canada's 
oun choice, not her limited resources, which restrain her independence. 
Canada uill only provide alterno.tivec 1·rhen the confrontation between poor 
and rich does not irnpince on those :;.nterests 1;-rhich the rich share and cleo.rly 
reco(Ylize. 
Houever, short of cuch confrontations, Co.no.do. can also have an effect by 
distributinc lThatever effort she deci<lcs to naLc o.ccorc~inc; to criteria g_uite 
different from those of other donors. One ::;et of such criteria could be, for 
example, based upon the o.tterJj_)t to identify the countries r:1ore liLely to achieve 
the naximun development impact. Such criteria Hould have the virtue, in the 
Canadian context .. of cm appearance of neutrality. It is doubtful, of course, 
uhether a si1,1ple set of such criteria could be defined.; there are also, for 
e:rnnple, simple redistributive objectives 1rhich micht also seeE1 desiro.ble 
(e.g., famine relief-type motivation). 
Provision of o.id to those lil::ely to uake most effective use of it uoulc.1 
provide for po.tte1°ns of fino.nce quite cUffercnt frOi:1 those of other Llaj or donors. 
Hm-r far would it be 1,ossible for Canada in practice to gursue such a rac1ically 
neutral course? 
A little thouc;ht uould :i.nc1icate soi;1e cj_fficulties. Could Canada envisace 
the possibilit~r of provic1inc; ai6. proc:;raEJY,1es to lforth Korea, or Horth Vietno.rn, 
for e::o.nple? This is too e:~treue :C'or ~.1ost Canadians but the dramatic diplomatic 
achievements of France suc;c:;est tlmt inC:tcpern:1ent courses of action are possible. 
Possibl~r, houever, the course 1.1hich could uost easily be folloued, is for 
Canada to move in Gicnificantly different directions from Al.nerican-Anc;lo policy, 
1·1hile avoic1inc; overt challenc;e" 11hen a developinc country bec;ins to pursue 
policies render inc; it someuho.t suspect in terr;is of foreic:;n policies of the "Free 
1/orld 11 , but has not ;,ret been promoted to the list of public enemies;, it i:1ight 
be possible for Canada to e::tenc1 support uithout a.ppearinc; too obviously outrageous. 
If Canada uere ,lillinG to ado~'.lt such 2. role, coulcl it not be aro;ued that her 
own proc:;rar.JL1es Houlcl contain the setlile Geec..1s of denoralization ·which were identified 
above as the key danr,;er o:f:' c:;:istin,::; )ro,3raLrr,1es? This i:s unlil:ely, for a nmi1ber 
of reasons. If Canaclo. souc)rt out those cow.1tries 11ho smelt rather bad in the 
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noses of the other Free ".-Jorld c;overnments, the chances are that the governments 
concerned uoulc1 be precisely those Hho are assertinc; national autonomy and are 
least susceptible to cultural demoralization. Secondly, Canada ·will al1rays enter 
the scene as an influence slic;htly different fror,1 the previous external influence. 
U.S. involvement in Africa, for e;:ample, often has the beneficial effect in under­
mininc; the mystique and cultural influence of the previous colonial power, 
merely because alternatives are offered, in relation to education for exrunple, 
which implicitly challenge the assumptions of existing institutions. To some 
degree Canadian influence uoulcl not present the danc;er of bolste1·in13 inherited 
colonial institutions. 
Also, Canada has all the blandness of a prosperous but minor power. 
Along with S,·ritzerlanc1 and Scandinavia, Canada share the characteristics of 
substantial success in achievinG economic ·well-being along with the absence 
of Imperial aobition, neither as a conter.1.)..Jorary career, nor as an historical 
inheritance, nor even as a dream of things to come. One has only to talk of 
a Canadian, or a Swiss empire to realize how ludicrous the idea is. It is 
the fate of such countries to produce neither revolutions nor empires--but 
as Switzerland has shown, it is possible for ther.1 to becoue havens both for 
fugitive funds and. refut;ee politicians. It is possible for them to consider 
revolutions with eqmmimity--they are neither lil8..y to be imported nor do they 
challenge any ambition. It is reasonable to suppo-se that Canada could mount 
an aid progro.mme less attach<;d to a. set of ideological values than those nations 
responsible for the 1wrlc.1' s future. Therein lies the irnvortance of unimportance. 
However skillfully Canada uses her aid proc;rarnne there is an upper limit 
on the effect that can be obtained frorn this instrtunent. He l;Jay through clever 
planninc; increase the leverage of our aid, but the pressure ue can e~::ert is still 
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limited by the fact that it is unlikely that we uill spend r.mch more than l~~ of 
G.N.P., if that. If ,Te uant to play a more iL1portant role; ue must find less 
costly devices. International trade is one such instr1m1ent, since it has the 
advantac;e of benefitine; both tradinc; partners. 1;n iDaGinative trade policy Hill 
enable us to help others o.c ,·rell as ourselves and ,-Iithout straininc; charitable 
instincts. 
There can be little c:oubt that there is much roori1 for improvement in the 
efficiency with Hhich we trade 11ith the third world; the obstacle iG that it would 
require us to thinl~ the unthinb:tble; to consider policies uhich every layman lmows 
to be 1.-Jronc; but every economist l:nous to be right. If, for example, -we decided 
to import certain lilanufactured c;oods from tmclerdeveloped countries, they uould 
gain because of the increased marLet, uhi1e we ,wuld gain f1~om lower costs. In 
other words, throuc;h trade ,·re can use the production facilities of other countries 
to supplement our mm. At the so.ue tide, they can use our specific resources to 
supplement their::;. 
He would have to pay for these increased inports through increased exports 
and there's the rub. lle have been so used to thinkinc; in terms of export pessimism 
that this problem seems to be an overuhellilinc; one. A little care ,rould shou that 
it is not. 
First and most important, there is a severe shortage of food loor.1inc; on the 
horizon. Canada could probably increase production of fooclstuffs at constant 
prices much more quickly than underdeveloped countries can. The reason we will 
have difficulty sellinc; as much as 11e can produce is that the tmderdeveloped 
cotmtries "\Till have difficulty payin13 for it. If ue bou[3ht 1aore manufactured 
Goods, He could sell nore ac;riculturul productso Clearly, there is a need for a 
far more imaginative trade--creatinc; policy by Canada than has been the case to date. 
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There is no need to restrict our thinkinc; to the export of foodstuffs. 
'rhe underdeveloped countries have an insatiable denand for machinery of all 
l:inc.1s. If Canadian industry used its ingenuity, it could open up large r.mrkets 
for sale to the third ,rorld; provided of course , ue ,,rere willinc; to buy from it 
as well. 
If these profitable possibilities for trade are not taken advantac.;e of, it 
uill not be because they do not exist, but because Canada has not had enouGh 
ir.iagination, 
The first requirement would be a 1'lillinc;ness to imac;ine c;radual but radical 
changes in our econo1;i.ic structure. 1Te would give up some of our industries and 
import these c;oods fron afar. He would therefore c;ain flexibility; c.Uversifyine; 
our trade sources and increasing our independence by loosenin~ certain of our 
present close ties. Secondly 1 our comparative advantage uoulcl come to depend 
more on our st.ills and technoloc;y than our natural resource base. The skills 
of our entrepreneurs and labour could be increased and our "capacity to transform" 
enhanced. 
If we decided on this course of action; ne,1 institutions for promotinc; trade 
uould be needed. Just lmrerinc; tariff and other barriers is not enou13h. One of 
the most important obstacles to increased trade is inadequate information on 
marketing opportunities. The present international distribution anc1 cor.rraercial 
system is more suited to the inadequate patterns of trade of the past than to the 
task of creatinG new possibilities for the future. Construction of neu trade 
channels requires c;overnrnent as ,•;rell as r>riva.te initiative and thouc;h it would 
involve many difficulties, the payoff' uill be corTespondincly higlL 
In the pre sent conte:::t, United .States a.ml Etll'O~'Je have not tat.en ac1vantac;e 
of profitable neu opportunities, :;_:iartly because of their political oblic;ations, 
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)O.rtly because tlie;:,r have a vested interest in the ezistinc; structure, and lmrtly 
because they are trapped b~r their old ideas. Co.no.c1a could use the opportunities 
available not only to increase her own trade with the third vorld, but also to 
increase trade beti:reen other rich countries and the third world. Cano.da could 
play an active role as an economic i;1iddleman in the international economy just 
8.s she prides herself in playing a r.1ic1cUe role in the political systen. Although 
a small pouer, Canada can act as a broker bet1veen more powerful interests. 
Not only could Canada trade more, she might think in term8 of investine; 
nore abroad. Canadians are Do used to thinkinc; of themselves as a capital-scarce 
country and a recipient of foreicn investment that they ha.ve not considered the 
possibility of reversinG the role. 
Canada, relative to the uorlcl as a 11hole, is richly endowed uitll capital, 
technoloc;y, and entrepreneurship. Her long experience uith foreic;n investors 
could be used to devise ne-11 forms, more beneficial to the recipient country 
than those available at present. Canada could perhaps create a neu t;:,rpe of 
international corporation. J.iost firL1s at lJresent are not international but, in 
:i-:--act, have their center of gravity in a particular developed corn1try. Their 
mo.rl:.etinc; concepts, personnel policies, and technoloesy are developed in the 
conditions of the advanced countries and are often ill-suited to more bacbmrd 
countries. These corporations have limited horizons and do not understand the 
production problems and factor availability in the underdeveloped. 11orld. They 
are very larce, feu in number) and have c:;reat barGaininc pouer vis-a-vis the veak 
,zovernments of the underdeveloped worlds. As pTofit maximizinG institutions; they 
use this power fully, often bacLecl up by the political strene;th of their country" 
As an example of Hhat Canada could do; consider the effect of the Italian Oil 
Corapany, a publicly owned corporation) ,Thich for a uhile challenged the 
- -
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oligopolistic position of the existinc; oil firms. It offered bette1· terms, new 
fo::-i;1s of orc;anization, and c;o.ve the underdeveloped country an enlarc;ecl set of 
alternatives fron uhich to choose. 
As Dudley Seers Iloints out, sL10.ll countries facinc; bic; companies are in a 
much stronger barc;aininc; position 11hen there is c;e.nuine co1;rpetition. 12 If it were 
1,oosible to create Canaclian firus ca1xi.ble of independent action in the inter-
national economy and willing to upset e:xistinc; structures, Canadian business night 
be able to play a creative role. 
VI 
Canada is small, rich and fits nicely into her niche. Her policies are sober 
and sensible; in aid as elseuhere. One choice is to continue alon:::; established 
paths. 
Hhat does it mean to have an independent foreic:n policy? If 
1-,e o.e;ree Hith the policies of the major powers J there is no reason to bahave 
differentl~r. If 1-re clisacree, \Je have sone difficult clecisions to :mo.l:e. 
There is a small bird Hhich feeds by pickin,'.; food fror.1 betueen the teeth 
of the hippopotauus; this bird is most expert in jude:inc; when hippopotarai close 
their r:ioutlrn. (Note: One source claims that the story is apocryphal o.nd any 
applies to a crocodile. No matter!) 
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